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This paper revisits the classic argument that a system of local governments financing public service
provision via property taxes will produce an efficient allocation of both housing and services if communities
can implement zoning ordinances. The novel feature of the analysis is a dynamic model in which housing
stocks and public policies are endogenously determined. In each period, citizens choose both the level
of services for their communities and the zoning ordinances that govern future new construction. The
main result of the paper is that there does not exist an equilibrium which has a steady state that is both
efficient and satisfies a local stability property. The paper also develops examples in which equilibrium
allocations converge to a steady state in which there is over-zoning and households are forced to over-consume








In the U.S., public services like education, police, and libraries, are provided by local govern-
ments whose primary source of revenue has traditionally been the property tax.1 Given this,
the eﬃciency properties of a system of local governments ﬁnancing public service provision via
property taxes have long been of interest. In a classic paper, Hamilton (1975) argued that such
a system could produce an eﬃcient allocation of both housing and services if local governments
could implement zoning ordinances. This optimistic vision of local public ﬁnance has been very
inﬂuential, giving rise to the so-called BeneﬁtV i e wwhich argues that the property tax should be
seen as a non-distortionary and non-redistributive user charge for public services.2
Hamilton’s conclusion was striking since economic intuition suggests property taxes will distort
both housing choices and public service levels. Housing choices will be distorted since households
will seek lower quality houses to avoid taxation. Public service levels will be distorted because
households will base their demand for services on the tax price of services which will not typically
reﬂect the true price. If the decisive voter in a community has a house less valuable than the
average property, his tax price will be lower than the true price, and services will be over-provided.
By contrast, services will be under-provided when the decisive voter’s house is of above average
value.
The intuition for Hamilton’s result was that through zoning, local governments can establish
minimum housing qualities for their communities. Households then sort into communities based
on their desired housing quality levels. Nobody will build a higher quality house than the minimum
permitted, since they would be better oﬀ building such a house in a more tightly zoned community
in order to get a lower tax price of services. Thus, in equilibrium, communities will comprise of
homogeneous properties. Homogeneity implies that in equilibrium, in all communities, the tax
price faced by voters equals the true price and services will be provided eﬃciently. Property taxes
will be beneﬁtt a x e sin that each household’s tax bill exactly equals the cost of the services it
consumes. Beneﬁt taxes lead households to choose between communities eﬃciently.
Hamilton’s analysis did not specify a precise model of how communities set their zoning or-
1 For a history of the use of the property tax in the U.S. see Wallis (2001).
2 The Beneﬁt View is distinct from the New View that sees the property tax as a distortionary tax on the
local use of capital. For a formal exposition of the New View see Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986). For discussion
and further debate see Fischel (1992, 2001a, 2001c), Mieszkowski and Zodrow (1989), Nechyba (2001) and Zodrow
(2001a, 2001b).
1dinances and public service levels. Rather, his basic argument simply assumed that households
faced a set of communities oﬀering a full range of policies. As noted by White (1975), this begs
the question of what options would be available to households in equilibrium. While subsequent
literature has attempted to clarify the issue, the task is diﬃcult because the problem has a nat-
ural dynamic structure. Zoning ordinances are chosen by existing residents and impact only new
construction. It is therefore through its eﬀect on new construction that zoning determines the
composition of communities and housing prices. However, the literature employs static models in
which distinctions between existing and future residents and old and new construction are hard
to capture.
This paper presents a novel dynamic model of a system of local governments ﬁnancing services
by property taxation in which policies are chosen by existing residents and housing stocks evolve
over time. It uses this model to analyze how communities choose zoning and the eﬃciency of the
resulting allocations. The model’s dynamic structure allows the impact of zoning on both new
construction and the existing stock of housing to be captured. In particular, it captures the key
grandfathering characteristic of zoning whereby existing property is exempt from regulation.
When choosing zoning, existing residents anticipate how zoning will impact the value of their
properties and also the tax price and level of services in their community. Existing residents would
like to boost the value of their homes, while at thes a m et i m el o w e r i n gt h e i rt a xp r i c eo fs e r v i c e s
and keeping service levels in line with their preferences. The main result of the paper is that there
does not exist an equilibrium with endogenous zoning which has a steady state that is eﬃcient
and satisﬁes a local stability property. This result directly challenges Hamilton’s argument and
the BeneﬁtV i e wo ft h ep r o p e r t yt a x .
The basic intuition for the main result is simple. In an eﬃcient steady state communities will
be stratiﬁed according to their housing qualities. A full mix of housing qualities is necessary for
eﬃciency. Consider the community with the lowest quality housing and imagine that it deviated
from the equilibrium by imposing more stringent zoning. In the short run, this would raise the
prices of existing low quality homes by restricting supply. It would have no adverse eﬀect on
the tax price of services in the community, because the only homes that could be built in the
community would be of higher quality than the existing stock and thus command a higher price.
Thus, in the short run all existing residents would beneﬁt from deviating from the equilibrium.
In the long run, matters are more complicated because the deviation could create future policy
2changes in other communities that might be harmful. However, if the equilibrium satisﬁes a local
stability property, such harmful future policy eﬀects can be ruled out.
This negative ﬁnding naturally raises the question of what will happen in the long run when
zoning decisions are endogenous. While the paper does not provide a complete answer to this
question, it does develop some suggestive examples. In these examples, allocations converge to a
s t e a d ys t a t ei nw h i c ht h e r ei sover-zoning. In such a steady state, households with weaker pref-
erences for housing are forced to over-consume housing. This can result in welfare being actually
lower with zoning than without. Interestingly, in these examples, communities are homogenous
in steady state so that property taxes are beneﬁt taxes and service levels are eﬃcient. This com-
ponent of the Beneﬁt View of the property tax is therefore upheld. The problem is that housing
decisions are distorted directly by zoning.
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 identiﬁes related
literature and Section 3 introduces the model. Sections 4 and 5 set the stage by discussing
equilibrium without zoning and with exogenous zoning. The heart of the paper is Section 6 which
considers endogenous zoning. This section presents the ineﬃciency result, the examples, and
discusses the implications of the ﬁndings for the Beneﬁt View. Section 7 argues that the results
are robust to allowing more communities and Section 8 concludes.
2 Related literature
The paper relates to three distinct literatures. The ﬁrst is the state and local public ﬁnance
literature on Tiebout models. In a seminal paper, Tiebout (1956) suggested that the mechanism of
households “voting with their feet” by choosing between communities on the basis of their public
service-tax packages could improve allocative eﬃciency. His idea was that households would sort
into communities with others who had similar demands for services and this sorting would create
gains in public service surplus. Since then, a large theoretical literature has developed exploring
this basic idea.3
Tiebout’s analysis assumed that local governments ﬁnanced service provision by head taxes.
Since head taxes are rarely part of the public ﬁnance landscape, the literature quickly developed
Tiebout models incorporating property tax ﬁnance. There are two varieties, distinguished by their
3 For an excellent review of this literature see Ross and Yinger (1999).
3assumptions about housing supply. Both assume that households have preferences deﬁned over
housing, private consumption, and public services, that communities ﬁnance service provision by
a proportional tax on housing, and that service levels are chosen collectively by residents. The
ﬁrst variety assumes that housing is supplied by absentee landlords according to exogenously given
supply schedules (for example, Epple, Filimon and Romer (1984)). In these models, households are
best interpreted as renters. The second variety assumes that the housing stock is ﬁxed and owned
by residents (for example, Hamilton (1976) and Nechyba (1997)). Property taxation complicates
Tiebout sorting because the tax price of services is below the true price for households who
consume relatively less housing. This makes it attractive for households to live in communities
where they consume relatively less housing. In the ﬁrst variety, this force makes it diﬃcult to ﬁnd
stable allocations of households across communities. In the second, it results in capitalization:
small houses in communities with a larger fraction of large houses cost more.4
The model presented here builds on these Tiebout models with property taxation. It follows
the second variety in assuming existing houses are owned by residents. However, new houses can
be built by competitive construction ﬁrms. In the spirit of the ﬁrst variety, the location of new
construction is inﬂuenced by the existing mix of homes in the communities as this determines
the tax price of services. The main advance incorporated in the model is its dynamic structure.
The importance of introducing dynamics into Tiebout models has long been recognized, but there
appear to have been few successful attempts to do so.5 While used here to study zoning, the
model could be employed to analyze other policy decisions with dynamic consequences, such as
public infrastructure investments.
The second related literature is that on zoning.6 The traditional justiﬁcation for zoning is
to deal with externalities. Such externality zoning can, for example, prevent over-crowding of
4 The diﬃculties in ﬁnding stable allocations in the ﬁrst variety of model can be overcome with appropriate
assumptions. Epple, Filimon and Romer (1993) prove the existence of equilibrium in a model in which households
have identical preferences and diﬀerent income levels. Equilibrium involves communities stratiﬁed by income levels.
Lower income households do not wish to live in higher income communities even though the tax price of services
is lower, because the overall spending on services is higher than they would like. As shown by Nechyba (1997), in
the second variety of model equilibrium exists under general conditions.
5 One exception is Epple, Romano and Sieg (2009) who extend the Epple et al (1984) model to incorporate
overlapping generations. Their key concern is to understand how households switch communities over the life cycle
as their children grow up and services like education become less salient. Their model assumes that households
rent housing in each period and that the supply of housing is time invariant, so they are not concerned with the
political behavior of owner occupiers and the regulation of new construction.
6 For an excellent introduction to zoning and other land-use regulations see Fischel (1999).
4communities. However, it has long been recognized that zoning can be employed to alter the
allocation of the costs of public services between existing residents and newcomers or outsiders,
ap r a c t i c ek n o w na sﬁscal zoning.7 Hamilton’s work highlights a normatively attractive aspect
of such zoning by showing how it could be used to overcome the problem of newcomers paying
less than their fair share of services by buying cheaper houses. But, as emphasized by White
(1975), zoning might also be used to force newcomers to pay more than their fair share, a practice
she refers to as ﬁscal-squeeze zoning. In addition, zoning could be used by existing residents
to increase the value of their homes by restricting supply, which White calls scarcity zoning.
T h e s ea b u s e so fz o n i n gm i g h tg i v er i s et oover-zoning (Davis (1963)), whereby the supply of
housing is ineﬃciently restricted. This paper’s dynamic model captures the distributional conﬂict
between existing residents and newcomers, and permits a uniﬁe dt r e a t m e n to ft h eu s eo fz o n i n g
to manipulate both housing prices and the surplus obtained from public services.
There are two prior studies of zoning in Tiebout models with property taxes.8 Fernandez
and Rogerson (1997) study the impact of zoning in a two-community model of the variable hous-
ing supply variety. They model zoning as a minimum housing level and assume that only one
community imposes it. They ﬁrst study the impact of an exogenous zoning requirement and then
analyze an endogenously determined level. They assume residents ﬁrst choose a community to
live in, then choose property taxes and zoning, and ﬁnally choose a level of housing. They analyze
how the incorporation of zoning impacts allocations and welfare, uncovering a number of subtle
eﬀects.
A limitation of the Fernandez and Rogerson analysis, is that communities are ﬁxed by the
time zoning decisions are made so that their impact on community composition is not captured.
To address this, Calabrese, Epple and Romano (2007) incorporate zoning in a diﬀerent way.
Households ﬁrst choose an initial community of residence, which is committed by a purchase of
land and then residents collectively choose zoning and property taxes for their communities.9
7 See, for example, Margolis (1956). Zoning may also be motivated by the desire to change the type of household
entering the community. Residents may believe requiring new houses to have large lots will attract a better class of
resident. This may reduce crime and yield better peer groups in schools. This is referred to as exclusionary zoning
and is analyzed in Oates (1977) and Calabrese, Epple and Romano (2006).
8 See also Pogodzinski and Sass (1994) who present a theoretical framework to underpin their empirical inves-
tigation of the impact of zoning on housing values.
9 While Fernandez and Rogerson assume that residents choose taxes and zoning sequentially, Calabrese et al
assume a simultaneous choice. To get around the potential diﬃculties created by a two dimensional policy space,
they employ the citizen-candidate approach and assume that residents elect a citizen to choose policy rather than
5After these policy choices, households revisit their choice of community and purchase housing
and consume public services in their new community. This quasi-dynamic structure means that
residents anticipate the impact of their decisions on land prices and community composition.
Calabrese et al show that, without zoning, all communities are identical. With zoning, there is
stratiﬁcation, with higher income communities having stricter minimum housing requirements.
Zoning leads to aggregate welfare gains because it reduces distortions in both housing and public
service provision. However, in contrast to Hamilton’s analysis, it does not result in ﬁrst best
outcomes.
The main advantage of this paper’s model over these works lies in its dynamic structure. This
allows the impact of zoning on the value of the existing stock of housing to be captured. While
in Calabrese et al’s quasi-dynamic set-up households anticipate how zoning impacts the value
of their land, all housing is produced after zoning ordinances have been decided. The dynamic
structure also allows the key grandfathering characteristic of zoning whereby existing property is
exempt from regulation to be captured. By contrast, in the models of Fernandez and Rogerson
and Calabrese et al, households are bound by the constraints that they impose.
Zoning is a particular type of land-use regulation. The importance of such regulations in
understanding housing markets in the U.S. has been demonstrated in a number of recent studies
(see, for example, Glaeser and Gyourko (2003), Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks (2005), and Green,
Malpezzi, and Mayo (2005)). This has led to increasing interest in the determinants of these
regulations (see, for example, Glaeser and Ward (2009)). Ortalo-Magne and Prat (2011) develop
an innovative theoretical model which sheds light on the simultaneous determination of households’
location decisions, their housing choices, and collective decisions on housing restrictions. They
study an inﬁnite horizon overlapping generation model of an economy with a rural and urban
area. Households must live where they work and households in the urban area can rent or own
housing. The urban wage is uncertain which makes rental rates and house prices uncertain. The
number of urban houses is initially ﬁxed but supply can be expanded. However, new construction
requires a permit and permits are controlled by urban residents. Price eﬀects mean that residents
are more likely to oppose new construction if they own rather than rent, so political choices
depend on the endogenous extent of home ownership. Ortalo-Magne and Prat demonstrate the
existence of equilibria in which the supply of urban houses is ineﬃciently restricted. In its focus
directly vote over policies.
6on dynamic ineﬃciencies in housing supply generated by political choices, this paper complements
Ortalo-Magne and Prat’s work.
The third related literature on dynamic models of political economy. The last two decades
have seen considerable progress in this area, with the literature moving from two period models
with simple underlying policy spaces to inﬁnite-horizon models with rich fundamentals. Important
examples can be found in the macroeconomic literature which has explored the political deter-
mination of capital and labor taxes in the neoclassical growth model (see, for example, Krusell,
Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (1997) and Krusell and Rios-Rull (1999)). In these analyses, citizens’
accumulation of assets is impacted by current a n df u t u r et a x e sw h i c hi nt u r nd e p e n du p o nt h e
distribution of assets. Similarly, in this paper’s analysis, citizens’ housing decisions are impacted
by current and future policies which in turn depend upon housing stocks. Accordingly, the notion
of political equilibrium used here follows the approach taken in these works.
3T h e m o d e l
Consider a geographic area consisting of two communities, indexed by  ∈ {12}.T h et i m eh o r i z o n
is inﬁnite, with periods indexed by  ∈ {0∞}. A constant population of households of size 1
need to reside in the area, but there is turnover, so that in each period new households arrive and
old ones leave. The probability that a household residing in the area will need to remain there in
the subsequent period is . Thus, in each period, a fraction 1 −  of households leave the area
and are replaced by an equal number of new ones.10
T h eo n l yw a yt ol i v ei nt h ea r e ai st oo w nah o u s ei no n eo ft h ec o m m u n i t i e s . 11 Houses
come in two types, large and small. Houses are durable, but a ﬁxed fraction  of the stock in
each community is destroyed at the end of each period.12 This fraction is assumed to be less
than 1−, so that households face a higher probability of having to leave the area than of having
10 We have in mind that households leave for reasons to do with employment opportunities or changes in family
circumstance.
11 The model does not “micro-found” why households cannot rent houses. The usual assumption is that moral
hazard issues in the maintenance of the house make owning the more eﬃcient arrangement. Obviously, if households
were renters they would have diﬀerent incentives with respect to property values. On these issues see Ortalo-Magne
and Prat (2011).
12 This assumption follows Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) and is necessary to get turnover of the housing stock.
Given the constant population, if all houses were inﬁnitely durable there would be no dynamics. By housing being
“destroyed”, we have in mind both literal destruction by ﬂoods, hurricanes, ﬁres, or termites, and also houses being
torn down because of decay due to the passage of time.
7their houses destroyed. New houses can be built in each period and the cost of building a house
of type  ∈ {} is  where   . Each community has enough land to accomodate a
population of size 1 and land has no alternative use.13 The stock of old houses of type  in
community  at the beginning of a period is denoted  and new construction is denoted .
New construction is completed at the beginning of each period and new and old houses are perfect
substitutes. Thus, post construction, there are  +  type  houses in community .
A public service is provided in each community. The service level in community  is denoted
. The cost of the service is  per household.14
Each household receives an exogenous income of  per period.15 When living in the area,
households have preferences deﬁned over housing, public services, and private consumption. They
diﬀer in their preferences for large houses which are measured by the parameter .Ah o u s e h o l d
of type  with private consumption  and services  obtains a period payoﬀ of  +  + ()i fi t
lives in a large house and  + () if it lives in a small house. The service beneﬁtf u n c t i o n()
is non-decreasing and concave.16 When not living in the area, a household’s payoﬀ just depends
on its private consumption. Households discount future payoﬀsa tr a t e and can borrow and save
at rate 1 − 1 .T h ef r a c t i o no fh o u s e h o l d sw ith type less than or equal to  is ().
There are competitive housing markets in both communities which open at the beginning of
each period. Demand comes from new households moving into the area and remaining residents
who need new houses or who want to move. Supply comes from owners leaving the area, res-
idents who want to move, and new construction. New construction is supplied by competitive
construction ﬁrms. The price of houses of type  in community  is denoted .
Service provision in each community  is ﬁnanced by a proportional tax  on the value of
property
P
 (+). Each community must balance its budget in each period implying
13 This implies that the supply of housing in each community is perfectly elastic over the relevant range which
is in the spirit of Hamilton’s assumptions. The model can be extended to allow land not used for housing to have
some constant productivity in agricultural use. This complicates notation without fundamentally changing the
insights from the analysis.
14 This speciﬁcation is consistent with Hamilton (1975) who assumed that the average cost of providing services
equals the marginal cost. This assumption eliminates concern about optimal community size. In static models,
introducing either public good features in service provision or congestion externalities leads to additional sources
of ineﬃciency as discussed by, among others, Buchanan and Goetz (1972). An interesting topic for future research
is to see how these problems play out in dynamic models.
15 There are no income eﬀects so income heterogeneity can be introduced without changing the results.
16 This preference speciﬁcation implies that households have identical preferences for public services and, in this
sense, the model diﬀers from standard Tiebout models. It is possible to add heterogeneous service preferences to








( + )  ∈ {12} (1)
The level of service provision in any period is chosen collectively by the residents of the community
that period. The service level preferred by a majority of residents is implemented.
The timing of the model is as follows. Each period begins with a stock of old houses O =
(1 1 2 2) of aggregate size 1 − . Existing residents learn whether they will be re-
maining in the area and new households arrive. Housing markets open, housing prices P =
(1 1 2 2) are determined, and new construction N =( 1 1 2 2) takes place.
The total amount of new construction must equal . The housing market activity determines the
post-construction housing stocks O+N. Residents then choose the public service levels 1 and 2
which determine the property tax rates 1 and 2. Finally, at the end of the period, a fraction  of
the housing stock in each community is destroyed. All houses, new and old, are equally likely to
be destroyed, implying that next period’s stock of old houses is given by O0 =( 1−)(O+N).17
4 Equilibrium without zoning
We begin by analyzing what would happen without zoning. This will clarify the distortions created
by property taxation that zoning is supposed to overcome. We ﬁrst deﬁne what is meant by an
equilibrium and then discuss some properties of equilibrium. Next we study steady states and
discuss the existence of equilibrium and convergence to these steady states. Finally, we discuss
the eﬃciency of these steady states.
4.1 Deﬁnition of equilibrium
The model has a recursive structure. The state can be summarized by the stock of old houses O.18
Given this stock, the housing market determines prices and new construction and we recognize
this dependence by writing P(O)a n dN(O). The prices P(O) and post-construction housing stock
O+N(O) then determine the tax bases of the two communities and these in turn determine public
service levels (1(O) 2(O)) and tax rates (1(O) 2(O)). Households understand what prices,
17 While it would be more realistic to assume that older houses were more likely to be destroyed, introducing
this feature would require keeping track of the age of each house and allowing for age-dependent housing prices.
This would make the analysis intractable.
18 Under our assumptions of no income eﬀects and costless mobility, the allocation of homes among households
does not impact market outcomes or policy determination. Thus, it is not necessary to keep track of this allocation
as a state variable.
9new construction, services, and taxes will be given any initial state O. They also understand that
next period’s stock of old houses will be given by O0 =( 1− )(O + N(O)). They treat all these
aggregate relationships as exogenous and beyond their control.
Decisions of households At the beginning of any period, households fall into two groups:
those who resided in the area in the previous period and those who did not, but must in the
current period. The ﬁrst group is diﬀerentiated by the homes they own. There are ﬁve possible
home ownership states represented by  ∈ {1122∅};  =  means that the household
owns a type  house in community  and  = ∅ means that it does not own a house (which would
be the case if its house was destroyed). The second group of households will not own homes, so
that  = ∅ for all these households.






where ∅(O) = 0. The remaining households in the ﬁrst group and all those in the second
must decide in which community to live and in what type of house. Formally, they must make a
home ownership decision  ∈ {1122}. Since selling a house and moving is costless and
houses of the same type are perfect substitutes, there is no loss of generality in assuming that all
households owning houses at the beginning of any period sell them. This makes each household’s
home ownership decision independent of its home ownership state . It also means that the only
future consequences of the current period choice of housing is through the selling price in the
subsequent period.
To make this more precise, let (O) denote the expected payoﬀ of a household of type  at the
beginning of a period in which it has to live in the area, does not own a house, and the aggregate
state is O. Then, the expected payoﬀ of a household of type  at the beginning of a period in
which it has to live in the area and is in home ownership state  is
(O)+(O) (3)
The value function (O)s a t i s ﬁes the functional equation





 + () + (()(O)) − ()(O)(O) − (O)







10where  is an indicator function equal to 1 if  equals , () is the house type associated
with home ownership choice ,a n d() is the community associated with .L e t (O)b et h e
set of optimal home ownership choices. This will contain more than one element if, for example,
households are indiﬀerent between communities. The household’s home ownership choice will
determine probabilistically its home ownership state in the next period. For example, if  = 1,
then 0 = 1 with probability 1 −  and 0 = ∅ with probability .
Housing market equilibrium Construction ﬁrms are competitive and the production costs of
new homes are constant. Accordingly, the supplies of large and small homes are perfectly elastic
at the prices  and , respectively. This means that if (O)=, ﬁrms will willingly
supply any number of new homes of type  in community  but if (O)   none will be
supplied.
Let (O) be the fraction of type  households selecting houses of type  in community
 and let ξ(O) denote the vector (1(·) 1(·) 2(·) 2(·)). If a positive fraction of type 
households are selecting houses of type  in community  i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a t is in the
set of optimal choices for these households; i.e.,  ∈ (O). In equilibrium, it must be the case
that the total fraction of households selecting houses of type  in community  is equal to the




In addition, it must be the case that all households of type  are selecting some type of housing,






Choice of public service levels and tax rates All households get the same beneﬁtf r o m
public services. However, residents living in diﬀerent houses face diﬀerent tax prices for services,
which may give rise to diﬀerent preferred service levels. Using (1), the preferred service level for
residents of type  houses in community  is
∗((O)) = argmax
 {() − (O)} (7)
11where (O) is the tax price of services that residents of type  houses in community  face





where (O) is the fraction of post-construction houses that are large in community .20 The
tax price is determined by the relative price of type  houses in community  and the fraction of
large houses. If large houses are more expensive than small houses, the tax price is lower for those
owning small houses and is decreasing in the fraction of large houses. The majority preferred level





∗((O)) if (O) ≥ 12
∗((O)) if (O)  12
 (9)





Equilibrium An equilibrium without zoning consists of a price rule P(O), a new construction
rule N(O), public service rules (1(O) 2(O)), tax rules (1(O) 2(O) ) ,a n d ,f o re a c hh o u s e h o l d
type, a value function (O), a housing demand correspondence (O) and housing selection
functions ξ(O), such that three conditions are satisﬁed. First, household optimization:f o r
each household type  the value function (O)s a t i s ﬁes (4) and, for all O, every element of
(O) solves the maximization problem described in (4). Second, housing market equilibrium:
the housing selection functions and new construction rules satisfy (5) and (6), and, in addition,
(O)i sp o s i t i v eo n l yi fis an element of (O)a n d(O)i sp o s i t i v eo n l yi f(O)=.
Third, majority rule: the public service and tax rules satisfy (9) and (10).
19 The simplicity of these optimal public service levels reﬂects the assumption that policies are chosen after the
market for housing has cleared. At that point, the housing stock and its value are predetermined. When it is
chosen, the property tax is therefore like a non-distortionary tax on capital and equilibrium responses are irrelevant
for the calculus of citizen decision-making. While taxes and public services do impact the housing market, it is the
expectation of these taxes and services that are relevant and the taxes chosen today do not inﬂuence expectations
concerning tomorrow’s taxes. This contrasts with Tiebout models with property taxation of the variable housing
supply variety which assume taxes are chosen before housing choices are made. In this spirit, an alternative
modelling assumption would be that in each period contemporaneous property taxes are ﬁxed and households vote
on next period’s taxes. Households would then anticipate how next period’s taxes would impact next period’s
housing market equilibrium. While this assumption is perhaps less natural than the assumption made here (and
certainly more complicated), it would be interesting to work out its implications.
20 That is, (O)=
+(O)
+(O)++(O)
124.2 Some properties of equilibrium
Inspecting the household’s problem (4) and using the deﬁnitions in (8) and (10), it is clear that a
household choosing a type  house will prefer to live in the community that maximizes21
[() − ] −  + (1 − )0
 (11)
The term in square brackets is the public service surplus associated with community ,w h i c hi s
the diﬀerence between service beneﬁts and the tax cost. The second term is the current price of
at y p e house in community  and the ﬁnal term is the discounted expected value of the house
next period. Notice that (11) is independent of , so that all households choosing type  houses
have the same preferences over communities. Thus, in equilibrium, if type  houses are available
in both communities, all those choosing them must be indiﬀerent between communities. It follows
from (11) that for  ∈ {}
[(1) − 11] − 1 + (1 − )0
1 =[ (2) − 22] − 2 + (1 − )0
2 (12)
This arbitrage equation implies that diﬀerences in public service surplus across communities must
be capitalized into diﬀerences in housing prices as argued by Hamilton (1976).
From the household’s problem (4), we also see that a household will prefer a large house in
community  to a small house if its preference  exceeds
 −  − (1 − )(0
 − 0
)+(  − ) (13)
This expression represents the higher cost of a large house and includes both price and tax diﬀer-
ences. Note that (12) implies that (13) is equalized across communities. Thus, letting
 =  −  − (1 − )(0
 − 0
)+(  − ) (14)
it follows from (12) and (13) that all households with preference larger than  will prefer a large





( + ) (15)
21 The term 0






( + ) (16)
Exactly how types with preference larger than  are allocated across the two communities does
not matter, provided that (5) and (6) are satisﬁed. Similarly, for types with preference smaller
than .
4.3 Steady states
G i v e na ne q u i l i b r i u m ,as t o c ko fo l dh o u s e sO∗ is a steady state if new construction at O∗ is such
as to maintain the stock constant. The following proposition tells us what steady states look like.
Proposition 1 Let ∗ be a steady state of an equilibrium without zoning. Then, the fraction
of large houses in each community is the same; that is, 1(∗)=2(∗)=∗.I ft h i sf r a c t i o n
exceeds 12, the public service level in each community is ∗
 ≡ ∗( 
∗+(1−∗)) and households
live in large houses if their preference exceeds
(1 − (1 − ))( − )+
( − )
∗ + (1 − ∗)
∗
 (17)
If the fraction is less than 12, the service level is ∗
 ≡ ∗( 
∗+(1−∗)) and households live in
large houses if their preference exceeds
(1 − (1 − ))( − )+
( − )
∗ + (1 − ∗)
∗
 (18)
Proof: If O∗ is an equilibrium steady state, then, N(O∗)=O∗(1−). Thus, since ∗
  0f o r
all , it must be the case that there is new construction of both types of houses in both communi-
ties. Accordingly, housing prices must equal construction costs so that P(O∗)=(    ).
It must also be the case that the fraction of large houses in each community is the same; that is,
1(O∗)=2(O∗)=∗. For if one community had a greater fraction of large houses, the public
service surplus enjoyed by large house owners in that community would be higher than in the
other which would violate (12). Since both house prices and the fraction of large houses are the
same across the two communities, it follows from (9) and (10) that service levels and taxes are
also the same. If a majority of households own large houses (∗ ≥ 12), then, from (8) and (9),
the public service level will be ∗
 and, from (13), households live in large houses only if their pref-
erence exceeds the expression in (17). If a majority of households own small houses (∗  12),
14the public service level is ∗
 and households live in large houses only if their preference exceeds
the expression in (18). ¥
Note that the steady state stock of houses in the two communities is not tied down by this
proposition. It tells us only that the fraction of large houses in each community must be the
same.22 T h ec o m m u n i t i e sc a nb eo fd i ﬀerent sizes in long run equilibrium.23
4.4 Existence of equilibrium and convergence to steady states
Proposition 1 assumes an equilibrium exists and tells us what equilibrium steady states must look
like. It tells us nothing about the existence of equilibrium or equilibrium steady states. Nor does
it tell us whether in equilibrium the housing stock must converge to a steady state. We now brieﬂy
discuss these issues.
Discussing convergence requires some additional terminology. For any initial state O,d e ﬁne
the sequence of old housing stocks hO(O)i
∞
=0 inductively as follows: O0(O)=O and O+1(O)=
(1−)[O(O)+N(O(O))]. Intuitively, if we start in period 0 with old housing stock O,i np e r i o d
 the stock will be O(O). Then, the sequence of housing stocks hO(O)i
∞
=0 converges to the
steady state O∗ if lim→∞ O(O)=O∗.
It is straightforward to ﬁnd equilibria in which the housing stock converges to a steady state.
The ﬁrst task is to ﬁnd a steady state. If there exists ∗ ≥ 12 satisfying the equation
∗ =1− ((1 − (1 − )+
∗

∗ +( 1− ∗)
)( − )) (19)
then there exists a steady state in which the fraction of large houses in each community is ∗ and
the public service level is ∗
. Similarly, if there exists ∗  12 satisfying the equation
∗ =1− ((1 − (1 − )+
∗

∗ +( 1− ∗)
)( − )) (20)
there exists a steady state in which the fraction of large houses in each community is ∗ and the
public service level is ∗
. Under mild conditions, there must exist either a ∗ ≥ 12 satisfying (19)
or a ∗  12 satisfying (20). Indeed, both could be true. For if small home owners are choosing
22 In his static model with two housing types and a proportional property tax, Hamilton (1976) conjectured
that in long run equilibrium it must be the case that the proportionate mix of housing in each community is the
same. Like us, he assumed that households diﬀered in their demand for housing. With income eﬀects or diﬀerent
preferences for public services, it should be possible to get stratiﬁcation as in Epple et al (1984).
23 The aggregate stock of large old houses ∗
1 +∗
2 must equal (1 −)∗ and the aggregate stock of small old
houses ∗
1 + ∗
2 must equal (1 − )(1 − ∗).
15services, property taxes will typically be higher than if large home owners are choosing. All else
equal, higher property taxes lead less households to choose large houses. It is perfectly possible,
therefore, to have one steady state in which large home owners are a majority and choose low
taxes, and another in which small home owners are a majority and choose high taxes.
Having found a steady state, the next step is to construct an equilibrium in which the housing
stock converges to this steady state. To illustrate, suppose there exists ∗  12 satisfying
equation (20) and consider constructing an equilibrium in which the fraction of large houses in
each community converges to ∗.C o n s i d e r ﬁrst starting from an initial state with a symmetric
allocation of old houses and assume the intial fraction of large houses is less than ∗. Then,
initially, all new construction will be in the form of large houses and will be balanced across the
communities. Once the fraction ∗ can be reached with new construction, construction of small
homes will begin and the steady state will be reached. During the adjustment to steady state
the price of small homes will be less than , but it will be increasing over time as the relative
fraction of small homes decreases.
Now suppose we start with one community (say, community 1) with a larger fraction of large
homes than the other, but with both still less than the steady state. In this case, all new con-
struction of large homes will occur in community 1. This is because of the more favorable tax
base. Eventually, community 2 will become so small that one period’s new construction of large
homes will be suﬃcient to equate the fraction of large homes in the two communities. After that,
new construction of both types of homes in the two communities can start. Community 2 can
remain a small size or increase in size relative to community 1. This is immaterial. During the
adjustment to steady state, the price of both large and small homes in community 2 will be lower
than in community 1. The superior tax base will therefore be capitalized into housing prices.
Finally, suppose that we start with one community (say, community 1) not only with a larger
fraction of large homes than the other, but with a larger fraction than the steady state. This
is the most complicated case. Here, there are a number of possible paths to the steady state,
depending on the aggregate stock of small homes. If there is an aggregate shortage of small
homes, construction of small homes occurs in community 1, reducing the fraction of large houses
in that community. In the meantime, community 2 shrinks. Eventually, community 2 becomes so
small that one period’s new construction of large homes will be suﬃcient to equate the fraction of
large homes in the two communities. If there is an aggregate glut of small homes, new construction
16of large homes will occur in community 1. For a while, the fraction of large homes in community 1
will increase futher away from the steady state as the stock of large homes is built up. Eventually,
however, the stock of large homes will be suﬃciently large that new construction of small homes
will begin and the fraction of large homes in community 2 will return towards the steady state
level. Again, new construction will only occur in community 1 once it has got suﬃciently small
that that one period’s new construction of large homes will be suﬃcient to equate the fraction of
large homes in the two communities.
4.5 Eﬃciency
The steady states described in Proposition 1 are not eﬃcient.24 From an eﬃciency perspective,
households should own a large house if their preference  exceeds
 ≡ (1 − (1 − ))( − ) (21)
From (17) and (18) of Proposition 1, the steady state fraction of large houses will be too low.25
Property taxation means that owners of large houses face a higher tax price of services and this
encourages households to purchase cheaper homes. Moreover, the eﬃcient level of public services
is
 ≡ ∗() = argmax{() − } (22)
From Proposition 1, when ∗(·) is increasing, public services will be under-provided if large home
owners are in the majority and over-provided if small home owners are in the majority. This
reﬂects the fact that property taxation drives the tax price of services below the true price for
small home owners and above it for large home owners.
Less obviously, when there are multiple equilibrium steady states, they may be Pareto ranked.
Suppose there exists two equilibrium steady states, ∗
 and ∗
, one in which large home owners
form a majority and the other in which small home owners are in the majority. All households are
better oﬀ when large home owners are a majority if small home owners are better oﬀ. This requires
that the public service surplus enjoyed by small home owners is higher when large home owners
form the majority. This is possible because, even though small home owners are not obtaining
24 By an eﬃcient steady state we mean one which maximizes aggregate surplus. This is the standard notion of
eﬃciency in the literature.
25 This is consistent with the arguments in Hamilton (1976).
17their ideal service level when large home owners are a majority, they beneﬁt from a larger tax
base.26
5 Equilibrium with exogenous zoning
To illustrate Hamilton’s argument in our dynamic model, we now suppose that from period 0
onwards, one community enforces a zoning requirement that requires all newly constructed houses
be large.27 Introducing zoning in this way does not substantially complicate the deﬁnition of
equilibrium. We only have to recognize that the zoning requirement impacts the housing market
equilibrium by limiting the supply of small homes in the zoned community. In particular, the
supply of small houses in any period is perfectly inelastic and just equals the old stock. This means
that the price of small houses in the zoned community can exceed the cost .A n equilibrium
with exogenous zoning is deﬁned to be an equilibrium that recognizes this constraint.
It is straightforward to characterize steady states with exogenous zoning.
Proposition 2 In a steady state of an equilibrium with exogenous zoning, all houses in the zoned
community are large and all houses in the unzoned community are small. The public service level
in each community is the eﬃcient level  deﬁned in (22) and each household pays  in property
taxes. Households live in the zoned community only if their preference exceeds the eﬃcient cut-oﬀ
 deﬁned in (21).
Proof: Suppose that community 1 is the zoned community. If O∗ is a steady state, then, under
zoning, it must be the case that ∗
1 = 0 and hence 1(O∗) = 1. It must also be the case that
∗
2 = 0 and hence that 2(O∗)=0 .T os e ew h y ,s u p p o s e ,t ot h ec o n t r a r y ,t h a t∗
2  0. Then it
must be the case that the steady state price of large houses in both communities is .S i n c et h e
price of small houses in community 2 is , the tax price of public services is lower for large house
owners in community 1. But this means public service surplus enjoyed by large house owners in
community 1 is higher than in community 2 which would violate (12). Since 1(O∗)= and
26 Interestingly, when there do exist multiple Pareto ranked equilibria, citizens could be better oﬀ with a property
tax limit which guaranteed that the ineﬃcient high tax steady state could not be reached.
27 In reality, zoning requirements must be backed by some type of externality justiﬁcation or they may be
challenged in court. Accordingly, zoning requirements are speciﬁed in terms of quantity constraints like minimum
lot size rather than simply minimum construction costs. There has been debate in the literature about how precisely
such quantity constraints allow communities to regulate new construction. Fischel (1992) argues persuasively for
the view that communities are able to regulate very precisely.
181(O∗)=1a n d2(O∗)= and 2(O∗) = 0, it follows from (9) and (10) that









Households living in community 1 pay property taxes equal to
∗()
  = ∗() and households
living in community 2 pay property taxes equal to
∗()
  = ∗(). From (4), it follows that
a household of type  will prefer living in a large house in community 1 to a small house in
community 2 if
 + (∗()) − ∗() −  + (1 − ) ≥ (∗()) − ∗() −  + (1 − )
or, equivalently, if their preference  exceeds  as deﬁned in (22). ¥
The key point to note about Proposition 2 is that the allocation of both housing and public
services in the steady state is eﬃcient. In the long run, the zoned community ends up with
only large houses and the unzoned community ends up with only small houses. Large houses
are not built in the unzoned community because large home owners enjoy a lower tax price of
services in the zoned community. Construction ﬁrms would love to build small houses in the
zoned community so that owners could beneﬁt from a lower tax price of services, but this is not
permitted. The homogeneity of communities implies that in equilibrium the tax price faced by
voters equals the true price and services are provided eﬃciently. Property taxes are beneﬁtt a x e s
in that each household’s tax bill exactly equals the cost of the services it consumes. Accordingly,
when choosing between the two communities, households simply decide whether the extra cost of
a large house is worth it to them. This leads to eﬃcient housing decisions.
In contrast to the case without zoning, the steady state stocks of housing are uniquely deﬁned:
there are (1 − )(1 − ()) old large houses in the zoned community and (1 − )()o l ds m a l l
houses in the unzoned community. As in the case without zoning, it is straightforward to construct
an equilibrium in which the housing stock converges to the steady state.28
28 If at the time zoning is imposed there are initially both types of houses in the two communities, then convergence
to the steady state will be asymptotic. In the approach to the steady state, both large and small houses in the
zoned district will be worth more than those in the unzoned district. Moreover, tax rates will be lower in the zoned
district. These two properties mean there should be a negative relationship between tax rates and house prices.
On the other hand, there will be a positive relationship between zoning and housing values.
196 Equilibrium with endogenous zoning
The previous section showed that if one community had a zoning ordinance requiring that all newly
constructed houses be large, then there is a unique steady state and it is eﬃcient. Moreover, there
exist equilibria in which housing stocks converge to this eﬃcient steady state. However, this begs
the question of whether communities would actually choose to implement zoning in this way.
Speciﬁcally, if in each period the communities could choose whether to implement zoning, would
the eﬃcient outcome arise?
To analyze this question, suppose that at the end of each period, after choosing taxes, the
residents of each community vote whether to impose a zoning ordinance which requires that all
construction in the subsequent period be large houses.29 The vote takes place before housing
stock is destroyed, so that at the time of voting, all residents own homes. Let  ∈ {01} denote
community ’s zoning regulation, with  = 1 meaning the ordinance is imposed.
With endogenous zoning, each period now begins with a stock of old houses O and the zoning
regulations Z =( 1 2) chosen by residents in the prior period. The housing market determines
prices and new construction under these regulations. As before, after the housing market has
cleared, residents choose service levels. Following this, residents choose next period’s zoning
regulations Z0. Finally, at the end of the period, a fraction of the housing stock is destroyed.
6.1 Deﬁnition of equilibrium
We begin by clarifying what is meant by equilibrium in the extended model. Prices and new con-
struction will now depend on both the initial housing stock and zoning regulations and so we write
P(OZ)a n dN(OZ). Similarly, we write the service levels as (1(OZ) 2(OZ)) and tax rates
as (1(OZ) 2(OZ)). Next period’s stock of old houses is given by O0 =( 1− )(O + N(OZ))
and next period’s zoning regulations by Z0(OZ).
Households’ decision-making with respect to home ownership is not fundamentally altered by
29 In some New England towns changes in zoning rules must be approved by the majority of citizens at town
meetings (Gyourko, Saiz and Summers (2008)). However, more generally, zoning decisions are made by a combi-
nation of local politicians and administrative boards (typically designated the Planning and Zoning Commission
and the Board of Zoning Adjustment) rather than determined by direct democracy. These boards are composed
of local citizens appointed by local politicians. Our assumption is that this decision-making process will produce
decisions that will reﬂect the will of the majority of residents. The mechanism we have in mind is that the electoral
process will select local politicians whose preferences are congruent with those of the majority of voters and they
will in turn appoint like-minded board members. Readers who object to this assumption can take comfort in the
fact that there will often be no signiﬁcant disagreement among residents. See Fischel (2001b) for more discussion
of local government decision making and a defense of the median voter assumption.
20the presence of zoning. We just let the value functions and optimal policy correspondences depend
upon Z by writing (OZ)a n d(OZ).30 Zoning impacts the housing market equilibrium by
limiting the supply of small homes as discussed in the previous section. Let (OZ)b et h e
fraction of type  households selecting houses of type  in community .Z o n i n go n l ya ﬀects the
choice of public service levels and tax rates through its impact on prices and new construction.
The additional work in deﬁning equilibrium comes in modelling the zoning decision. Suppose
the state is (OZ). At the time the zoning decision is made, the housing stock will be O + N(OZ)
and the fraction of type  households with type  houses in community  will be (OZ).
Using (2) and (3) and taking expectations, a type  household with a type  house in community
 will support imposing zoning if
(1 − )(O0(10
−)) + (O0(10
−)) + (1 − )

1−
≥ (1 − )(O0(00
−)) + (O0(00




where O0 denotes next period’s stock of old houses and 0
− denotes the zoning decision of the
other community.31 The two sides of the inequality are next period’s expected utility with and
without zoning. Taking expectations is necessary because at the time of voting the household
is uncertain whether its house will be destroyed and whether it will need to leave the area. Let
(;O00
−) = 1 if the household favors zoning and 0 otherwise. If Z0(OZ) are equilibrium
zoning decisions, then, for each community, 0
(OZ)=1i fam aj o r i t yo ft h ec o m m u n i t y ’ sr e s i d e n t s
favor zoning given that the other community is choosing 0












]()  0 (24)
Following the deﬁnition of equilibrium without zoning, an equilibrium with endogenous zoning
consists of a price rule P(OZ), a new construction rule N(OZ), public service rules (1(OZ) 2(OZ)),
tax rules (1(OZ) 2(OZ)), zoning rules Z0(OZ), and, for each type of household, value
functions (OZ), housing demand correspondences (OZ), and housing selection functions
30 Modifying (4), the value function (OZ)s a t i s ﬁes the functional equation
(OZ)= m a x
∈{1122}

 + () + (()(OZ)) − ()(OZ)(OZ) − (OZ)




where O0 =( 1− )(O + N(OZ)) and Z0 = Z0(OZ).
31 The prices  and value functions  assume that whatever this period’s zoning decision, in all subsequent
periods zoning policies will be determined by the equilibrium rule Z0(·).
21ξ(OZ), satisfying household optimization, housing market equilibrium, and majority rule. The
notion of housing market equilibrium deﬁned earlier is amended to include the requirement that
(OZ) is positive only if (OZ)= and  = 0, and the notion of majority rule is
extended to include the requirement that the zoning rule satisﬁes (24).
6.2 Understanding household preferences over zoning
To get a feel for household preferences over zoning, consider when a type  household with a type
 house in community  will favor imposing zoning. Assume ﬁr s tt h a ti tw i l lr e m a i no p t i m a lf o r
the household to live in a type  house in the next period regardless of the community’s regulation
decision. In equilibrium, the household will be indiﬀerent between communities so there is no loss
of generality in assuming that the household continues to locate in community .T h u s ,u s i n g( 4 ) ,
















where the 1 and 0 superscripts denote variables with and without zoning and ∆0 denotes the
diﬀerence in continuation payoﬀs with and without zoning. Substituting (25) into (23), we can
rewrite condition (23) as












)] + ∆0 ≥ 0 (26)
The ﬁrst term of (26) is the welfare impact resulting from changing next period’s price of type
 houses. Given that 1 −  , price increases are valued by households. Intuitively, when
h o u s e h o l d sa r em o r el i k e l yt ol e a v et h ea r e at h a nt oh a v et or e p l a c et h e i rh o u s e s ,ah i g h e rp r i c e
for the house type they own is beneﬁcial. Since zoning restricts the supply of small homes, it is
natural to expect 1
 to be at least as large as 0
. The impact on the price of large homes is less
clear as there are both supply and demand eﬀects.
The second term of (26) is the change in next period’s public service surplus resulting from
imposing zoning. This change could be positive or negative. Imposing zoning may increase the
fraction of large houses which will increase surplus by reducing tax prices. However, it will also
impact relative housing prices. If, for example, it raises the relative price of small houses, the
tax price paid by small home owners could increase. Imposing zoning may also have political
consequences that impact service levels. If large home owners become a majority, service levels
may be reduced, lowering surplus for small home owners.
22The ﬁnal term of (26), which is the diﬀerence in continuation values, can be decomposed in
exactly the same way as (23) if it is the case that the household will remain in a type  house in
the period after next. There will be an impact arising from changing housing prices, an impact
resulting from changing public service surplus, and a future impact. Repeated application of this
logic reveals that a household who will remain in a type  h o u s ea sl o n ga si tr e m a i n si nt h ea r e a





















 denotes the price of type  houses  periods after the decision to impose zoning
becomes eﬀective, 0
 denotes the price of type  houses  periods after the decision not to
impose zoning becomes eﬀective, etc. While this expression is useful in clarifying how zoning
impacts household welfare, evaluating its sign is complex because the consequences of today’s
zoning decision for future prices are unclear in general. In particular, today’s zoning decision
c o u l da l t e rt h ee n t i r ep a t ho ff u t u r en e wc o n s t r u c t i o n .
The preceding analysis assumes it will remain optimal for the household to live in the same
type of house regardless of the community’s zoning decision. However, if zoning expands the
supply of large homes, it must cause some households to live in large houses who would otherwise















)] + ∆0 ≥ 0 (28)
The ﬁrst term is the change in the value of the household’s current house, the second term is the
beneﬁt from owning a large home less the incremental cost,32 and the third term is the change
in public service surplus. The latter will likely be negative because the household faces a higher
tax price of services with a large house.
6.3 Endogenous zoning and eﬃciency
We now investigate whether eﬃcient results will obtain when communities choose their zoning
regulations in a decentralized manner period by period. To pose the question clearly, we ﬁrst clarify
terminology. Given an equilibrium with endogenous zoning, a stock of old housing and zoning rules
32 Note that this diﬀerence in purchase prices overstates the true increase in housing cost because it neglects the
beneﬁts of owning a more valuable asset next period, which show up in ∆0.
23(O∗Z∗)i sasteady state if new construction at (O∗Z∗)i ss u c ha st om a i n t a i nt h es t o c ka tO∗ and
if residents vote to maintain the zoning rules Z∗. Drawing on the discussion in Section 5, the steady
state (O∗Z∗)i seﬃcient if either Z∗ equals (10) and O∗ equals (1 − )(1 − ()00()),
or Z∗ equals (01) and O∗ equals (1 − )(0()1 − ()0). Generalizing the terminology
of Section 3, for any initial state (OZ) consider the sequence of old housing stocks and zoning
rules hO(OZ)Z(OZ)i
∞
=0 deﬁned inductively as follows: (O0(OZ)Z0(OZ)) = (OZ)a n d
(O+1(OZ)Z+1(OZ)) = ((1−)(O(·)+N(O(·)Z(·)))Z0(O(·)Z(·))). Starting in period 0
with old housing stock O and zoning rules Z,i np e r i o d the stocks will be O(OZ)a n dt h ez o n i n g
rules will be Z(OZ). The sequence of housing stocks and zoning rules hO(OZ)Z(OZ)i
∞
=0
converges to the steady state (O∗Z∗)i f( i )t h e r ee x i s t s∗ such that for all  bigger than ∗,
Z(·)e q u a l sZ∗, and (ii) lim→∞ O(·)=O∗.
Given this terminology, the question of interest is do there exist equilibria with endogenous
zoning in which the housing stock and zoning rules converge to an eﬃcient steady state for any
initial condition? We will demonstrate that there exists no equilibrium with endogenous zoning
which has a steady state that is eﬃcient and satisﬁes a stability property we call “strong local
stability”. The steady state (O∗Z∗)i sstrongly locally stable if there exists 0 such that for
any initial state (OZ) with the property that kO − O∗k we have that Z(OZ)=Z∗ for
 =1 ∞ and lim→∞ O(OZ)=O∗. Intuitively, what this means is that if we start with an
initial stock of old houses close to the steady state level and perturb the zoning rules from their
steady state levels, then in the next period citizens will return the zoning rules to their steady
state levels. Moreover, thereafter, the zoning rules will remain at Z∗ and the housing stock will
gradually return to its steady state level. The concept is slightly stronger than local stability which
would require only that eventually zoning rules return to their steady state values. Since by the
deﬁnition of a steady state, Z∗ are the equilibrium zoning rules when the post-construction housing
stock is O∗+N(O∗Z∗), if  is small, the requirement is just that zoning choices are not sensitive
to small changes in post-construction housing stocks in the neighborhood of O∗ +N(O∗Z∗).33
Proposition 3 There exists no equilibrium with endogenous zoning which has a steady state that
is both eﬃcient and strongly locally stable.
Proof: See Appendix.
33 Given that new construction must sum to , we know that kO + N(OZ) − (O∗ + N(O∗Z∗))k must be less
than  + .
24To understand the result recall that at an eﬃcient steady state, one community consists of
large homes and the other of small. Moreover, the large home community imposes zoning and the
small home community does not. Suppose the small home community were to deviate and impose
zoning. What would be the response? Given the large home community is already imposing
zoning, the short run eﬀect would be to restrict the supply of small houses and raise their price.
There would be no detrimental eﬀect on public service surplus for home owners in the small home
community because their community already contains no large homes. The tax price for small
home owners can therefore only go down. Thus, the short run impact for residents of the small
home community is positive. The long run impact is more complex because it depends on how the
equilibrium responds to the deviation. In principle, the deviation could set into motion a series
of changes that end up causing harm to the residents of the small home community.34 This is
impossible to know without knowing the full path of equilibrium play. Nonetheless, if the eﬃcient
steady state is strongly locally stable, it can be shown that there will be no long run impact of the
deviation on the small home community. In the period following the one in which the deviation
becomes eﬀective, construction of small homes resumes and prices return to . All large home
construction takes place in the zoned community, so that the small home community remains
homogeneous. In this case, therefore, the small home community must beneﬁt from a deviation.
Proposition 3 does not rule out the possibility that there exists an equilibrium with endogenous
zoning which has a steady state that is eﬃcient but not strongly locally stable. Nonetheless, the
logic underlying the Proposition suggests that it will certainly be diﬃcult to ﬁnd equilibria with
endogenous zoning which have eﬃcient steady states. Moreover, even if such an equilibrium exists,
it seems unlikely that the housing stock and zoning rules will converge to the eﬃcient steady state.
6.4 Two examples
Proposition 3 suggests that endogenous zoning decisions are unlikely to produce an eﬃcient out-
come. This negative ﬁnding naturally raises the question of what will happen in the long run when
zoning decisions are endogenous. This is a diﬃcult question to answer in general. The potentially
far-reaching consequences of today’s zoning decisions for future prices make ﬁnding steady states
34 For example, suppose that community 2 deviating leads community 1 to relax its zoning requirement. This
m a yl e a dl o w households to build in community 1 to take advantage of the better ﬁscal externality. This in turn
may reduce the price of small houses in community 2. This is an unlikely scenario, to be sure, because it is not
clear why community 1 would wish to remove zoning. But it is conceivable that there could be long run eﬀects on
the residents of community 1 that might justify the decision.
25with endogenous zoning very complex. Nonetheless, it is possible to develop examples and in this
sub-section we present a pair of these. In both, allocations converge to a steady state in which
there is over-zoning. In such a steady state, households with weaker preferences for housing are
forced to over-consume housing. This distortion in housing consumption results in welfare being
actually lower with zoning than without.
6.4.1 Example 1
Consider the case in which all households have housing preference parameter 0 and so are indif-
ferent between large and small houses.
Proposition 4 Suppose that all households are indiﬀerent between large and small houses. Then,
there exists an equilibrium with endogenous zoning in which both communities always impose
zoning.
Proof: See Appendix.
The key to the tractability of this example is that large and small houses are perfect substitutes
and hence must have the same price. Given this, public service surplus in each community is
independent of the housing stock. In an equilibrium in which both communities always impose
zoning, on the equilibrium path all houses are priced at  and services in each community are
set at the eﬃcient level. If one community deviates by removing zoning, all new construction
takes place in that community in the form of small houses. The price of houses drops to  but
there is no change in public service surplus. Following the deviation, all prices revert back to .
Accordingly, the deviation is undesirable.
Without zoning, all houses would be small in steady state. In the equilibrium of Proposition 4,
the stock of old houses converges to the steady state O∗ =( ( 1−)20(1−)20) so that, in the
limit, all houses are large. This is highly ineﬃcient given that no household gets any additional
beneﬁt from living in a large house.
6.4.2 Example 2
Suppose that there are two types of households: low types with preference 0 who are indiﬀerent
between large and small houses, and high types with preference  who prefer large houses. High
types make up a fraction  of the population. Further suppose that the public service is a threshold
service that yields beneﬁts up to some level  and none beyond that. Formally, ()= min{}
26where  is large relative to .W i t ht h i sb e n e ﬁt function, each community will provide the service
level  independent of the mix of housing and housing prices. Nonetheless, households still have
an incentive to care about the composition of their communities because this will impact their tax
prices.
Proposition 5 Suppose that there are two types of households and that the public service is a




)( − ) (29)
Then, if 12 and




there exists an equilibrium with endogenous zoning in which both communities always impose
zoning.
Proof: See Appendix.
To understand this result, note that since both communities always impose zoning, on the
equilibrium path the stock of old large houses gradually increases as small houses are replaced by
large. When the stock of old large houses has grown suﬃciently large so that it exceeds  − ,
the price of all houses in that period and beyond is . This is because, after new construction,
t h e r ew i l lb es u ﬃcient large houses for high types and the marginal buyer is a low type. Since low
types are indiﬀerent between large and small houses, their prices must be the same. In periods
before the stock of old large houses has reached  −  there will be insuﬃcient large houses for
high types. To induce high types to own small houses their prices must be below . This in turn
means that all new construction of large houses will be concentrated in the community with the
largest fraction of large houses to beneﬁt from the lower tax price of services. The price of large
houses in the other community will therefore be less than .
If one community deviates from equilibrium behavior by relaxing its zoning requirement, the
impact will depend on what the stock of old large houses is in the period the deviation becomes
eﬀective. If the stock exceeds  so that there are already suﬃcient large houses for high types,
all new construction will take place in the deviating community in the form of small houses. The
price of all houses will drop to  but there will be no change in public service surplus. Following
the period in which the deviation becomes eﬀective, all prices will revert back to . Accordingly,
the deviation will be undesirable.
27If the stock of old large houses is less than −, the deviation will create no change in behavior
under condition (29). All new construction will be in large houses just as it would be with zoning.
If this is the case, there is no incentive to deviate in this range.
T h et r i c k yc a s ei sw h e nt h es t o c ko fo l dl a r g eh o u s e sl i e sb e t w e e n− and . Under condition
(29), new construction of large houses will be such as to meet the demands of high types and the
remaining new construction will be in small houses in the deviating community. Since with zoning
the price of all houses would be , the impact of the deviation is to reduce the price of small
houses in the deviating community to . The deviation may also reduce the price of large houses
in the deviating community below  if new construction of large houses takes place in the other
community. In addition to this impact on the value of property, there is also an impact on public
service surplus. By reducing the relative price of small homes, the deviation reduces the tax price
for small home owners in the deviating community. Following the period in which the deviation
becomes eﬀective, all prices will revert back to . This is because the inital stock of old large
houses will be (1 − ) which exceeds  − .
In order for prospective owners of small homes not to want to deviate, the one period gain
in public service surplus must be less than the cost of a lower home value. That this is true for
low types who own small homes is guaranteed by (30). To see why, note from (26) that such an
individual will favor keeping zoning if
(1 −  − )[ − ]+(0
 − ) ≥ 0 (31)
where 0
 is the tax price for small home owners if zoning is removed. Next observe that 0
 ≥
 and hence
(1 −  − )[ − ]+(0
 − ) ≥ [ − ]
∙





Condition (30) guarantees that the right hand side of (32) is positive. High types will not be
prospective owners of small homes and therefore will not beneﬁt from removing zoning.35
The above argument relies on condition (29). Without this assumption, the implications of
a community deviating when the stock of old large houses is less than  are more complicated.
Consider again the case in which the stock lies between  −  and . Under the behavior just
35 The only group who might beneﬁt are low types who own large homes. But under the assumption that 12,
this group must be a minority of residents.
28described, in the period in which the deviation becomes eﬀective, the price of small houses in the
deviating community will be . In the following period, the price of these houses will jump to
, implying a large speculative gain from purchasing a small house. High types may be willing
to forego the beneﬁts of large home ownership for one period to beneﬁt from this gain. If this is
the case, all households will demand small homes and no new large homes will be constructed.
This will imply a reduction in the price of large homes in both communities. Moreover, in the
next period the stock of old large houses may fall below  −  and hence prices will not all equal
.
More generally, the possibility of this speculative gain may change the implications of a com-
munity deviating when the stock of old large houses is less than  −. There is no guarantee that
without zoning all new construction will be in the form of large houses. High types may prefer
small houses because they know they will appreciate in price. If small houses are constructed
when zoning is removed then this will delay the time at which the stock of old large houses has
grown suﬃciently large so that it exceeds  −  and all house prices equal . While this point
will eventually be reached, the deviation will change the dynamic adjustment and prices of both
small and large houses will be diﬀerent along the entire path.
The bottom line is that with a smaller willingness to pay of high types, a community deviating
may change housing prices in more than just the period in which the deviation becomes eﬀective.
This makes tracing out the implications of a deviation more involved. If removing zoning reduces
all housing prices, the basic trade oﬀ is unchanged. The costs of lower house values must be
weighed against any beneﬁt from a more favorable tax price caused by a relative price change. A
condition similar to (30) would guarantee that cost exceeds beneﬁt in each period for a majority
of residents. However, the direction of future price changes is not clear and, in principle, it is
possible that removing zoning could increase house values in the deviating community in some
future period.36
As in the previous example, in this equilibrium the stock of old houses converges to the steady
state O∗ =( ( 1−)20(1−)20) so that, in the limit, all houses will be large. With no zoning,
36 In particular, it is not obvious that removing zoning will reduce future housing prices in the deviating commu-
nity. When the stock of old houses is less than  −, on the equilibrium path new construction of large homes will
take place in the community with the largest fraction of large homes. If the other community deviates by removing
zoning, it will attract new construction of small homes at the expense of new construction of large homes in the
zoned community. This will simultaneously reduce the future fraction of large houses in both communities. These
reductions will have opposing eﬀects on house prices in the deviating community.
29in steady state a fraction  of houses will be large. Zoning therefore reduces welfare.
6.5 Implications for the BeneﬁtV i e w
The Beneﬁt View of the property tax argues that, when communities are able to impose zoning
ordinances, property taxes will amount to non-distortionary user charges for public services. Thus,
property taxes neither distort housing choices nor public service levels. Taken literally, the view
implies that property taxation has no excess burden. This justiﬁes, for example, ignoring property
taxation when trying to estimate the deadweight cost of the U.S. tax system.
The theoretical underpinnings for the Beneﬁt View is Hamilton’s argument, which is illustrated
by Proposition 2. This argument presumes that households face a set of communities oﬀering a
full range of policies, begging the question of what options would be available to households
in equilibrium. Proposition 3 takes issue with the idea that eﬃcient outcomes will result when
communities actually choose their zoning ordinances. It suggests that some distortions should be
expected when services are ﬁnanced by property taxation, even when zoning is available. This
directly challenges the BeneﬁtV i e w .
Proposition 3 is a negative result and is silent on the precise nature of the distortions that
will arise. In the two examples, the distortions take the form of over-consumption of housing.
Both communities always choose to impose zoning, and, as a result, consist of only large houses
in the long run. This forces some households to live in large houses when their willingness to pay
is smaller than the incremental cost. This is the exact opposite of the distortion in the housing
market that arises without zoning and stems directly from communities’ zoning decisions. On
the other hand, since the communities are homogeneous, the tax price of services faced by voters
equals the true price. Property taxes are therefore beneﬁt taxes in the usual sense that each
household’s tax bill equals the value of services it consumes. As a result, services are provided at
eﬃcient levels. This aspect of the Beneﬁt View is therefore not challenged by the results of this
section.
307 More communities
In the environment of this paper, two communities are suﬃcient to achieve eﬃciency with exoge-
nous zoning.37 Thus, it seems reasonable to study endogenous zoning with only two communities.
However, this does raise the question of whether additional communities might be helpful in mit-
igating the problems that arise. In particular, the diﬃculties arise from residents using zoning to
manipulate the prices of their houses. In principle, more communities should reduce communities’
market power and dampen these incentives. This section considers this point by discussing the
consequences of introducing a third community.
Introducing an additional community creates no real changes in the model without zoning or
with exogenous zoning: Propositions 1 and 2 apply appropriately generalized. For the purposes
of Proposition 2, eﬃciency would result if one or two communities had zoning. In the former case,
there would be two small house communities and, in the latter, two large house communities.
The way in which homes are allocated across the homogeneous communities in the long run is
immaterial.
Proposition 3 also generalizes to the case of three communities.38 However, the logic under-
lying the argument needs to be slightly modiﬁed. This is because an additional community may
permit the existence of equilibria which have an eﬃcient steady state. Consider, for example, an
eﬃcient steady state in which community 1 is zoning, communities 2 and 3 are not zoning, and all
small homes are located in community 2. Suppose that at this eﬃcient steady state, community
2 deviates by imposing zoning. This will have no impact on housing prices in community 2, since
new construction of small houses will simply switch to community 3. Nonetheless, while commu-
nity 2 cannot inﬂuence the price of its homes by introducing zoning at the eﬃcient steady state,
it can for housing stocks arbitrarily close to the eﬃcient steady state. Moreover, at such housing
stocks, the majority of residents of community 2 will ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to introduce zoning. It
follows that the eﬃcient steady state cannot be strongly locally stable and Proposition 3 remains
true.
To understand the point, consider for  small and positive the stock O =( 1 − )(1 −
()0() − 00). This diﬀers from the eﬃcient steady state in that community 2 has a
37 More communities will be necessary with a larger number of types of housing and/or heterogeneity in public
service tastes.
38 The formal generalization of Proposition 3 can be found in the Appendix.
31small number of large houses. If the eﬃcient steady state is strongly locally stable, the equilibrium
path starting from this stock will have community 1 implementing zoning and communities 2 and
3 not. New construction of small homes will occur only in community 2 because of the beneﬁcial
ﬁscal externality created by the large homes. If community 2 deviates by imposing zoning all
new construction of small homes will switch to community 3. However, the price of small homes
in community 2 must be higher than that in community 3 and so the deviation boosts prices in
community 2. Moreover, as a result of the deviation, the value of large homes in community 2
will also be higher because the fraction of large homes will be greater.
The short run impact of this deviation must be positive for those owning small homes in
community 2 for  suﬃciently small. To see this, let the prices of housing in community 2 in the
period in which the deviation takes eﬀect be (1
21
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2 ≤ (), inequality (33) must hold for suﬃciently small  given that 1 −  .
The long run impact of the deviation is also positive. Assuming the eﬃcient steady state
is strongly locally stable, new construction of small homes will resume in community 2 in the
period following the one in which the deviation becomes eﬀective. The price of small homes will
therefore return to the construction cost . However, both the price and fraction of large homes
in community 2 will be marginally higher than on the equilibrium path. This increases the public
service surplus of small home owners. It follows that community 2 would vote to introduce zoning
at the stock O =( 1−)(1−()0()−00). The basic message that the housing stock
and zoning rules are unlikely to converge to an eﬃcient steady state therefore remains.
Finally, note that Propositions 4 and 5 generalize so that the message from these two examples
also remains. We conclude that the diﬃculties with endogenous zoning are not mitigated by
32introducing more communities.
8 Conclusion
This paper has presented a novel dynamic model that can be used to analyze theoretical issues
in state and local public ﬁnance. The model has been employed to revisit a classic question in
public ﬁnance concerning the ability of a system of local governments ﬁnancing public services
with property taxes to produce eﬃcient allocations of both housing and services. The analysis
conﬁrms Hamilton’s insight that, with the right zoning ordinances, such a system can yield eﬃcient
results. However, it also suggests that local governments will be unlikely to choose the right zoning
ordinances. Indeed, allowing local governments to implement zoning may actually reduce long run
welfare.
The results challenge the BeneﬁtV i e wof the property tax in the sense that they contradict the
argument that combining decentralized property taxation and zoning will yield ﬁrst best results.
However, they do not contradict the narrower position that, with zoning, property taxes will be
beneﬁt taxes. It is just that this narrower claim is besides the point. Property taxes being beneﬁt
taxes does not imply that housing decisions are undistorted, since such decisions can be directly
distorted by the supply restrictions embodied in zoning.
It should nonetheless be stressed that the results of this paper do not imply that property tax-
a t i o ni sab a dw a yo fﬁnancing local government.39 In particular, if we take it as an institutional
constraint that communities are able to implement zoning ordinances, then property taxation
may be an excellent system of ﬁnance. To illustrate, suppose that to keep housing prices high,
communities would implement zoning whether they ﬁnanced public services with head taxes or
property taxes. Then, property taxes will be equivalent to head taxes. The point is that housing is
distorted by zoning under both methods of ﬁnance and property taxes create no additional distor-
tions relative to head taxes. Sales or income taxation, on the other hand, will distort consumption
and labor supply decisions and will not obviously change housing distortions by inﬂuencing zoning
decisions.
39 For a nice overview of the debate about whether local governments should use property or income taxes see
Oates and Schwab (2004). For alternative political economy perspectives see Glaeser (1996) and Hoxby (1999).
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369A p p e n d i x
9.1 Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists an equilibrium with endogenous zoning with a steady
state (O∗Z∗)w h i c hi sb o t he ﬃcient and strongly locally stable. Assume that community 1 is the
community who zones so that O∗ =( 1−)(1− ()00()) and Z∗ =( 1 0) Since (O∗Z∗)
is a steady state, it must be that N(O∗Z∗)=(1 − ()00()) and Z0(O∗Z∗)=( 1 0).
However, we claim that 0
2(O∗Z∗) 6= 0, which will establish a contradiction.
We will show that all residents of community 2 would be better oﬀ imposing zoning if the state
were (O∗Z∗). Recall that community 2 consists of all households of type  ≤  and that at the
time of voting they all own small houses. The continuation payoﬀ for a resident of type  if zoning
is not implemented is




Since (O∗Z∗) is a steady state, we have that for all  ≤ 





(O∗Z∗) ≡  ∗ =





Note that this continuation payoﬀ is independent of .
The continuation payoﬀ if zoning is implemented for a household of type  ≤  is




To evaluate this, we need to know what happens following community 2’s deviation to impose
zoning. Consider the sequence hOZi
∞
=0 deﬁned inductively as follows: (O0Z0)=( O∗(11))
and (O+1Z+1)=( ( 1− )(O + N(OZ))Z0(OZ)) In addition, for all  =0 ∞,l e t
P = P(OZ)a n dN = N(OZ). Then, (O0Z0N0P0) describes variables in the period
in which the deviation becomes eﬀective, (O1Z1N1P1) describes variables in the ﬁrst period
following the deviation, etc. Since (O∗Z∗) is strongly locally stable and kO∗ − O∗k =0 ,w ek n o w
that for all  ≥ 1, Z = Z∗ and that lim→∞ O = O∗.
Claim 1: For suﬃciently large , 1 =  and 2 = .
37P r o o fo fC l a i m1 :To prove this it is enough to show that for suﬃciently large , 1  0
and 2  0. But this follows from the fact that lim→∞ O = O∗ and that O∗ =( 1 −
)(1− ()00()). ¥
Claim 2: For all  =0 ∞, 1(OZ)=1a n d2(OZ)=0 .
P r o o fo fC l a i m2 :We know that 1(O0Z0)=1b e c a u s e( 10 10)=( ( 1−)(1−())0)
and, since zoning is in place in community 1, we have that 10 = 0. Moreover, by strong local
stability, zoning is in place in all future periods and thus it must be that 1(OZ) = 1 for all .
We know that (20 20)=( 0 (1−)()). We also claim that for all  ≥ 0, 2 =0 .T o
see this, suppose, to the contrary, that 2  0. Then, in order for households to want to buy
t h e s eh o u s e si tm u s tb et h a t
[(2) − 2] −  + (1 − )2+1 ≥ [() − ] − 1 + (1 − )1+1
But because community 2 has small houses and community 1 does not, it must be that
(2) − 2  () − 
Thus, for the above inequality to hold, we must have that 2+1  1+1.B u tw ek n o wt h a t
community arbitrage implies that
[(2+1) − 2+12+1] − 2+1 + (1 − )2+2 =[ () − ] − 1+1 + (1 − )1+2
But again because community 2 has small houses, it must be that
[(2+1) − 2+12+1]  [() − ]
Thus, we require 2+2  1+2. Continuing this line of argument, we conclude that 2  1
for all  =1 ∞. But we know by the previous claim that for suﬃciently large ,i tm u s tb e
that 1 = . It follows that for all  ≥ 0, (O0Z0)=0 . ¥
Claim 3: 20   and for all  ≥ 1, 2 = .
Proof of Claim 3: By Claim 1 we know that for suﬃciently large  it must be that (1 2)=
( ). Let b  be the largest period in which (1 2) 6=(  ). Suppose ﬁrst that b  =0 .
Then all we need to show is that 20  . We know that O0 =( 1− )(1 − ()00()),
that N0 =( 000) and that 10 = .W ea l s ok n o wt h a t11 =  and that 21 = .
Suppose to the contrary that 20 ≤ . Then, it must be that all types with preferences less
38than  strictly prefer small houses in community 2 implying that demand is at least equal to
(). Supply, however, is equal to (1 − )().
Now suppose that b  ≥ 1. Since Z  =( 1 0), there are two possibilities in period b :( i )1  = ,
2   ,a n d1  = , and (ii) 1   , 2  = ,a n d2  = . We now show
that possibility (i) cannot arise. Suppose, to the contrary, that it does arise. Then, given that
(1 +1 2 +1)=(  ), we know that it must be that 1  +  ≤ 1 − ()a n dt h a t
2  ≥ (). This is because all households with types  less than  will strictly prefer to
purchase a small house at these prices. Thus, we must have that 2  ≥ ()i no r d e rf o rt h e
housing market to clear. Now consider period b  − 1. Suppose that 2 −1 (). Then, since
2  ≥ (), there must be new construction of small houses in community 2 in period b −1. In
that case, 2 −1 = , but since the price of small houses falls in period b , no households with
types greater than  will want to purchase a small house in community 2. Accordingly, we have
that 2 −1 + 2 −1 ≤ () .B u tt h e nw eh a v et h a t
2  =( 1− )[2 −1 + 2 −1] ()
which is a contradiction. Thus, 2 −1 ≥ (). This in turn implies that 1 −1 = , 2 −1 
,a n dt h a t1 −1 =  Again, there can be no new construction of small houses, because all
households of type greater than  will want large houses. Continuing this line of argument, we
conclude that for all  =1 b , we must have that 2 ≥ (). But since 20 =( 1−)()
and 20 =0 ,w eh a v et h a t
21 =( 1− )[20 + 20]=( 1− )2() ()
which is a contradiction. We conclude therefore that it cannot be that 1  = , 2   ,
and 1  = .
We have therefore established that in period b , 1   , 2  = ,a n d2  = .I fb  ≥ 2,
consider period b  − 1. Again, there are two possibilities: (i) 1 −1 = , 2 −1  ,a n d
1 −1 = , and (ii) 1 −1  , 2 −1 = ,a n d2 −1 = . Using similar logic, we can
again show that possibility (i) cannot arise.
Continuing on in this way, we conclude that for all  =1 b ,w eh a v et h a t1   ,
2  = ,a n d2  = . Now consider period 0, the period the deviation becomes eﬀective.
We know that O0 =( 1− )(1 − ()00()), that N0 =( 000) and that 10 = .
39We also know that 11 ≤  and that 21 = . We now argue that 20  . Suppose to
the contrary that 20 ≤ . Then, it must be the case that all types with preferences less than
 strictly prefer small houses in community 2 implying that demand is at least equal to ().
Supply, however, is equal to (1 − )(). ¥
We can now complete the proof of the Proposition. Consider the payoﬀ of a household of
type 0 under the deviation. As the household with the lowest preference for large houses, this
household can expect to remain in small houses in community 2 for as long as it remains in the
area. Thus, given that for all  ≥ 1, 2 =  and 2(OZ) = 0, we have that




This household will favor imposing zoning if











(1 −  − )[20 − ]
which is positive given that 1− . It follows that households of type 0 are in favor of imposing
zoning.
Now consider households of type  ∈ (0 ]. As noted, the continuation payoﬀ for these
residents if zoning is not implemented is exactly the same as for a type 0 household. On the other
hand, since a type  household can always make the same choices as a type 0 household, it must
b et h ec a s et h a t(O0(11)) ≥ 0(O0(11)). It therefore follows that









≥ (1 −  − )[20 − ]  0
Thus, households of type  ∈ (0] also favor imposing zoning. ¥
409.2 Proof of Proposition 4
We ﬁrst describe the components of our proposed equilibrium and then argue that it is indeed an
equilibrium. The new construction and price rules are given by
N(OZ)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
(0202) if Z =( 0 0)
(000)i f Z =( 1 0)
(000) if Z =( 0 1)







(   )i f Z 6=( 1 1)
(   )i f Z =( 1 1)







 if Z 6=( 1 1)

 if Z =( 1 1)

The zoning rules are Z0(OZ)=( 1 1).





 + () −  −  + [(1 − ) + 0 +( 1− )

1−]i f Z 6=( 1 1)
 + () −  −  + [(1 − ) + 0 +( 1− )

1−]i f Z =( 1 1)
where
0 =





The housing selection functions are ξ(0OZ)=O + N(OZ).
To establish that our proposed equilibrium is indeed an equilibrium we need to verify the three
requirements of equilibrium: household optimization, housing market equilibrium, and majority
rule. Household optimization is satisﬁed because all houses cost the same and, because  =0 ,
households are indiﬀerent between the available choices. Housing market equilibrium is satisﬁed
by construction. All new houses will be small unless both communities are zoning. Given that all
housing prices are the same, it does not matter where the new construction takes place. The public
s e r v i c er u l e ss a t i s f ym a j o r i t yr u l eb e c a u s eh o u s ep r i c e sa r ea l lt h es a m ea n dh e n c ea l lh o u s e h o l d s
41face a tax price of . They therefore demand a level of services ∗()=. Given (10), this implies
that the tax rules are as described.
It remains to check that the zoning decisions are optimal. We show only that the residents of
community 1 will support imposing zoning. The argument for community 2 is similar. Note from
(23) that a household with a type  house in community 1 will support imposing zoning when
community 2 is imposing zoning if
(1 − )[1(O0(11)) − 1(O0(01))] [0(O0(01)) − 0(O0(11))]
where O0 =( 1− )[O + N(OZ)]. But we have that
1(O0(11)) − 1(O0(01)) =  − 
and that
0(O0(01)) − 0(O0(11)) =  − .
Thus, since 1 −  , all households in community 1 will support imposing zoning as required.
¥
9.3 Proof of Proposition 5
The task is to construct an equilibrium with endogenous zoning in which both communities always
impose zoning. We ﬁrst describe the components of the equilibrium and then show the zoning
decisions are optimal.
9.3.1 The components of the equilibrium
Policy rules The public service rules in our proposed equilibrium are (1(OZ) 2(OZ)) =
() and the tax rules are given by (10). The zoning rules are Z0(OZ)=( 1 1)
New construction and prices For any initial stock of old houses O there are four possible
pairs of zoning regulations.
Case 1: Z =( 1 1)
In this case, we distinguish two sub-cases. The ﬁrst is when 1 + 2 +  ≥  so that post-
construction there are more large houses than there are high types. In this sub-case, we assume
that N(O(11)) = (2020) and that P(O(11)) = (   ) Because there are
42more large houses than there are high types, the marginal buyer is a low type and is indiﬀerent
between small and large houses. This indiﬀerence reﬂects not only preferences but also the fact
that, under this price rule, on the equilibrium path the price of all houses will equal  in the next
period. As a consequence, it is consistent with housing market equilibrium to have the price of all
houses equal to  in the current period. Given these uniform prices, households are indiﬀerent
between communities and hence new construction can be allocated evenly across communities.
The second sub-case is when 1 + 2 + so that post-construction there are less large
houses than there are high types in which case the marginal buyer is a high type. In this sub-case,
the price of small houses must be lower than that of large houses to induce high types to buy.
Given this price diﬀerential, new construction of large homes will take place in the community
with the largest fraction of large homes. We assume that new construction is concentrated in












Constructing the prices for this sub-case is more involved. Let ∗(O)b et h en u m b e ro fp e r i o d si t
takes for the post-construction stock of large houses to exceed  assuming that all new construction
is of large houses. Formally, ∗(O) is the smallest  such that
(1 − )(1 + 2)+
 X
=0
(1 − ) ≥ 
If both communities impose zoning in all future periods, in ∗(O) periods time the post-construction
stock of large houses will exceed the fraction of high types. Now deﬁn et h es e q u e n c eo fp r i c e s
(1(O) 1(O) 2(O) 2(O))
∗(O)
=0 as follows.
If 1(1 + 1)i sa tl e a s ta sl a r g ea s2(2 + 2), let 1(O)= for all  and
let (1(O) 2(O) 2(O))

∗(O)
=0 be the solution to the system of diﬀerence equations
 + (1 − )( − 1+1)=( 1+1)[ − 1]
 + (1 − )(2+1 − 2+1)=( 1+2)[2 − 2]
(1 + 1) − (1 − ) =( 1+2)2 − (1 − )2+1
with end point condition (1∗(O) 2∗(O) 2∗(O))=(   ) where the tax rates in the
43above system are given by
(1 2)=(

1 + 1(1 − 1)






(1 − )1 +
P
=0(1 − )







Intuitively, these prices represent the future path of prices up to and including the ﬁrst period
in which prices equal  assuming that both communities impose zoning. The ﬁrst equation
says that high types are indiﬀerent between large and small houses in community 1. The second
equation says the same thing for community 2 and the third equation says that high types are
indiﬀerent between buying large houses in the two communities. These equations imply that low
types prefer small houses and also that they are indiﬀerent between communities.
If 1(1 + 1)i sl e s st h a n2(2 + 2), let 2(O)= for all  and let
(1(O) 1(O) 2(O))
∗(O)
=0 be the solution to the system of diﬀerence equations
 + (1 − )(1+1 − 1+1)=( 1+1)[1 − 1]
 + (1 − )( − 2+1)=( 1+2)[2 − 2]
(1 + 1)1 − (1 − )1+1 =( 1+2) − (1 − )
w i t he n dp o i n tc o n d i t i o n( 1∗(O) 1∗(O) 2∗(O))=(   ), where the tax rates in the
above system are given by
(1 2)=(

1 + 1(1 − 1)









(1 − )2 +
P
=0(1 − )




Given these price sequences, we set
P(O(11)) = (10(O) 10(O) 20(O) 20(O))
This reﬂects the fact that both communities will continue to impose zoning on the equilibrium
path.
Case 2: Z =( 1 0)
There are three sub-cases to consider. The ﬁrst is when 2 + 1 ≥  so that the stock of
old large houses is larger than the number of high types. In this case, all new construction takes
44place in community 2 and it is all in small houses; i.e., N(O(10)) = (000). Moreover, prices
are all equal to ; i.e., P(O(10)) = (   ) This reﬂects the fact that the marginal
buyer is a low type who is indiﬀerent between large and small houses. This indiﬀerence reﬂects
not only preferences but also the fact that, because (1−)(2+1)+ ≥ , on the equilibrium
path the price of all houses will equal  in the next period.
The second sub-case is when 2+1+ ≤  so that even if all new construction is in the form
of large houses, the stock of houses post-construction can not exceed the number of high types.
In this case, if condition (29) is satisﬁed, things are exactly the same as with both communities
zoning; that is, all new construction is in the form of large houses and is located in the community
with the largest fraction of large homes. This means that N(O(10)) = N(O(11)) and that
P(O(10)) = P(O(11)). Intuitively, condition (29) guarantees that high types strictly prefer
large to small houses and hence new construction will respond to their demands.
The third sub-case is when 2+1  2+1+. In this case, we get suﬃcient new
construction of large houses to meet the demands of high types and the remaining new construction





( − 2 − 100 2 + 1 +  − )i f 1
1+1 ≥ 2
2+2+2+1+−
(00− 2 − 1 2 + 1 +  − )i f 1
1+1  2
2+2+2+1+−
Thus, new construction of small houses takes place in community 2 and new construction of large
houses takes place in which ever community has the largest fraction of large houses after the new
small houses are accounted for.
T u r n i n gt op r i c e s ,i f 1
1+1 ≥ 2
2+2+2+1+− then P(O(10)) = ( 1 2 )
where the prices (1 2) are such as to make small homeowners indiﬀerent between buying in
community 1 or community 2 and large homeowners indiﬀerent between buying in community 1
or community 2. Given that prices of all houses in the next period on the equilibrium path will
be , this requires that
(1 + 1)1 =( 1+2) &( 1 + 1) =( 1+2)2
w h e r et h et a xr a t e si nt h e s ee x p r e s s i o n sa r eg i v e nb y
(1 2)=(

1 + 1(1 − 1)







 − 2 + 1

2




2+2+2+1+− then P(O(10)) = (1 1  ) where the prices
(1 1) are such as to make small homeowners indiﬀerent between buying in community 1 or
community 2 and large homeowners indiﬀerent between buying in community 1 or community 2.
This requires that
(1 + 1)1 =( 1+2) &( 1 + 1)1 =( 1+2)
w h e r et h et a xr a t e si nt h e s ee x p r e s s i o n sa r eg i v e nb y
(1 2)=(

11 + 1(1 − 1)










2 + 1 + 
)
Case 3: Z =( 0 1)
This is just symmetric to the case in which Z =( 1 0).
Case 4: Z =( 0 0)
This case is similar to that in which only one community is zoning, except that new construction
can take place in both communities. The ﬁrst sub-case is when 2 + 1 ≥  so that the stock
of old large houses is larger than the number of high types. Then all new construction is in small
houses and is divided uniformly across communities; i.e., N(O(00)) = (0202). Moreover,
prices are all equal to ; i.e., P(O(00)) = (   ). Again, this reﬂects the fact that
the marginal buyer is a low type who is indiﬀerent between large and small houses and also that
on the equilibrium path all prices will equal  in the next period.
The second sub-case is when 2 + 1 +  ≤  so that even if all new construction is in
the form of large houses, the stock of houses post-construction can not exceed the number of
high types. In this case, if condition (29) is satisﬁed, things are exactly the same as with both
communities zoning, so N(O(00)) = N(O(11)) and P(O(00)) = P(O(11))
The third sub-case is when 2+1  2+1+. In this case, we get suﬃcient new
construction of large houses to meet the demands of high types and the remaining new construction
in the form of small houses. Where this new construction takes place depends upon the initial
46allocation of old houses. Speciﬁcally, we assume that if it would result in community 1 having at




2+2, N(O(00)) = (−2−1 2+1+−00) Prices are
given by P(O(00)) = (  2 2)w h e r e( 2 2) are such that small homeowners are
indiﬀerent between buying in community 1 or community 2 and large homeowners are indiﬀerent
between buying in community 1 or community 2; i.e.,
(1 + 1) =( 1+2)2 &( 1 + 1) =( 1+2)2
The tax rates in these expressions are given by
(1 2)=(

1 + (1 − 1)















2+2 then if all new construction is allocated in community 1 this would
result in a lower fraction of large houses in community 1 which would create incentives to build
in community 2. There are two possibilities. If
−1
2+2+ ≥ 1
1+1, then all new construction
takes place in community 2. Thus, N(O(00)) = (00− 2 − 1 2 + 1 +  − )a n d
P(O(00)) = (1 1  )w h e r e( 1 1) are such that small homeowners are indiﬀerent
between buying in community 1 or community 2 and large homeowners are indiﬀerent between
buying in community 1 or community 2; i.e.,
(1 + 1)1 =( 1+2) &( 1 + 1)1 =( 1+2)
The tax rates in these expressions are given by
(1 2)=(

11 + 1(1 − 1)















1+1 then putting all new construction in either community will not be
consistent with equilibrium. In this case, we assume that new construction is allocated across the
communities in such a way to equalize the fraction of large homes in each community. Thus,





1 + 1 + 2 + 1 = 
1 + 1 + 2 + 2 = 
Prices are P(O(00)) = (   )
Household value functions We deal ﬁrst with the case in which Z =( 1 1). If the initial stock
of old houses O is such that 2 +1 + ≥ , then since on the equilibrium path zoning will be
in place in all future periods, in that period and in all future periods, prices will equal .T h u s ,
we have that
0(O(11)) = 0 ≡






(O(11)) =  ≡





If the initial stock O is such that 2 + 1 +  , then it will take ∗(O)p e r i o d sb e -
fore the stock of large houses is such that all prices are . In the current period prices are
(10(O) 10(O) 20(O) 20(O)), in the following period prices are (11(O) 11(O) 21(O) 21(O)),
































For zoning decisions not on the equilibrium path Z 6=( 1 1) we have that:
0(OZ)= + () − (OZ) − (OZ)+(1 − )0((1 − )(O + N(OZ)))





(OZ)= +  + () − (OZ) − (OZ)+(1 − )0((1 − )(O + N(OZ)))




Thus, we have a temporary departure from the equilibrium path and then return to it with a
possibly diﬀerent initial stock of old houses.
Household demand and housing selection functions If 1+2+1(OZ)+2(OZ) 
,t h e nw eh a v et h a t0(OZ)={12} and (OZ)={1122}.I f 1 + 2 +
1(OZ)+2(OZ) ≥ ,t h e nw eh a v et h a t0(OZ)={1122} and (OZ)=
{12}.
If 1 +2 +1(OZ)+2(OZ) ≥ , the housing selection functions for high types are
(1(OZ) 1(OZ)) = (
1+1(OZ)
1+1(OZ)+2+2(OZ)0)




and for low types are






























If 1 + 2 + 1(OZ)+2(OZ) , the housing selection functions for high types are






























and for low types are
(1(0OZ) 1(0OZ)) = (0
1+1(OZ)
1+1(OZ)+2+2(OZ))




9.3.2 The zoning decisions are optimal
Having speciﬁed all the components of the equilibrium, it remains to show that Z0(OZ)=( 1 1)
is consistent with equilibrium. We show that community 1 will support zoning if it expects
49community 2 to impose zoning. The proof of the converse is similar. Let (OZ) be given and note
from (23) that a type  h o u s e h o l dw i t hat y p e house in community 1 will support imposing
zoning when community 2 is imposing zoning if
(1 − )[1(O0(11)) − 1(O0(01))] [(O0(01)) − (O0(11))] (39)
where O0 =( 1− )(O + N(OZ)).
Suppose ﬁrst that 0
1+0
2 ≥ . In this case, we know that 1+1(OZ)+2+2(OZ)
exceeds  and hence, at the time of voting, all high types own large homes while low types own
small and large homes. We also know that both 1(O0(11)) and 1(O0(11)) equal  and
that both 1(O0(01)) and 1(O0(01)) equal  Thus,
1(O0(11)) − 1(O0(01)) =  −  (40)




2 + 1(O0(01)) + 2(O0(01))] +  ≥ ,
we have that









This means that for  ∈ {0}
(O0(01)) − (O0(11)) =  −  (41)
Since 1 −  , (40) and (41) imply that (39) holds for both types of households, whatever type
of house they own. Intuitively, community 1 removing zoning in this range will simply result in
a one period reduction in the price of all houses from  to . Because prices remain uniform,
there will be no change in any household’s tax price of services.
Next suppose that 0
1 + 0
2 +  ≤ . In this case, relaxing zoning has no eﬀect on prices or
new construction, so accordingly, all residents of community 1 favor keeping it in place.




2 + . In this case, it could be that
1+1(OZ)+2+2(OZ) exceeds  and hence, at the time of voting, all high types own
large homes while low types own small and large homes. It could also be that 1 +1(OZ)+
2 + 2(OZ)i sl e s st h a n, so that all low types own small houses and high types own both
large and small homes. We also know that both 1(O0(11)) and 1(O0(11)) equal  and
that 1(O0(01)) equals  In addition, we know that 1(O0(01)) ≤  Thus,
1(O0(11)) − 1(O0(01)) =  −  (42)
and
1(O0(11)) − 1(O0(01)) =  − 1(O0(01)) ≥ 0 (43)
Turning to the value functions, we again have that 0(O0(11)) = 0 and that (O0(11)) = .
In addition, we have that









Thus, we have that
0(O0(01)) − 0(O0(11)) = ( − 1(O0(01))) +  −  (44)
and that
(O0(01)) − (O0(11)) = ( − 1(O0(01))) +  − 1(O0(01)) (45)
To show that (39) holds for low types who own small homes, we must demonstrate that
(1 −  − )( − )  ( − 1(O0(01)))
Intuitively, the impact of removing zoning is going to be a one period reduction in the price of
small homes from  to . The relative price of small homes must fall and hence the tax price
of services for small home owners could rise. The cost of the housing price decrease must exceed




1(O0(01))1(O0(01)) + (1 − 1(O0(01)))
and thus
 − 1(O0(01)) = 
∙
1(O0(01))[1(O0(01)) − ]
1(O0(01))1(O0(01)) + (1 − 1(O0(01)))
¸

In order for low types with small homes to want to keep zoning we require that













Thus, it suﬃces to show that






This follows from (30).
To show that (39) holds for high types who own large houses, we need to show that
(1 −  − )( − 1(O0(01)))  ( − 1(O0(01)))
But we know that
1(O0(01)) =
1(O0(01))
1(O0(01))1(O0(01)) + (1 − 1(O0(01)))

and hence this follows from the assumption that 1 −  . Intuitively, for high types owning
large homes, removing zoning both reduces the value of their homes and raises the tax price of
services. To show that (39) holds for high types who own small houses, we need to show that
(1 − )( − ) [( − 1(O0(01))) +  − 1(O0(01))]
But this follows immediately since   1(O0(01)). This formula reﬂects the fact that high
types who own small homes will, with or without zoning, own large homes next period.
The only remaining group is low types who own large homes. This group may indeed prefer
to relax zoning. We may assume that, with or without zoning, households in this group sell their
52large homes and buy small homes in the next period. Relaxing zoning may decrease the value of
their homes somewhat but may reduce their tax price of services by a greater amount. However,
we claim that this group must be a minority. This requires showing that
1(0OZ)(1 − )  1(OZ) + 1(0OZ)(1 − )
If low types own large homes it must be the case that 1+1(OZ)+2+2(OZ) exceeds
. From the selection rules (35) and (36), we know that
1(0OZ)(1 − )=[ 1 + 1(OZ)]
∙
1 + 1(OZ)+2 + 2(OZ) − 





1 + 1(OZ)+2 + 2(OZ)
) +1+1(OZ)
Thus, it suﬃces to show that
(
1 + 1(OZ)
1 + 1(OZ)+2 + 2(OZ)
) ≥ [1 + 1(OZ)]
∙
1 + 1(OZ)+2 + 2(OZ) − 
1 + 1(OZ)+2 + 2(OZ)
¸
which is equivalent to
 ≥ 1 + 1(OZ)+2 + 2(OZ) − 
But we know that
0
1 + 0
2 =( 1− )[1 + 1(OZ)+2 + 2(OZ)] 
which implies that




Thus, all we need is that 12 which holds by assumption. This completes the proof. ¥
9.4 Extension of Proposition 3 to three communities
Note ﬁrst there is a sense in which Proposition 3 is trivially true when we have three communities.
Take an eﬃcient steady state in which, say, communities 2 and 3 are unzoned and the small houses
are allocated in community 2 so that Z∗ =( 1 00) and O∗ =( 1− )(1 − ()00()00).
Consider for  small and positive the stock O =( 1−)(1−()00()−0). Thus, com-
pared with O∗, O features a small number of large houses in community 3. Deﬁne hO(O∗Z∗)Z(O∗Z∗)i
∞
=0
53in the usual way and assume that Z(O∗Z∗)=Z∗ for all . Then it cannot be the case that
lim→∞ O(O∗Z∗)=O∗. This is because, by virtue of having a small fraction of large houses,
community 3 is now a more attractive place to build new small houses than community 2. This
means the fraction of small houses in community 3 will grow relative to that in community 2 and
lim→∞ O(O∗Z∗)=( 1− )(1 − ()0000()). It follows that (O∗Z∗)i sn o ts t r o n g l y
locally stable in the sense deﬁned earlier.
Nonetheless, from an eﬃciency perspective there is nothing troubling about this example.
Whether in the long run all the small housing is located in community 2, community 3, or both, is
immaterial. The diﬃculty is that the division of construction across the two unzoned communities
is arbitrary and small diﬀerences between the two communities will force it in one or the other
direction. To reﬂect this, we modify our deﬁnition of strong local stability. For any given zoning
rules Z,l e tΦ(Z)i st h es e to fh o u s i n gs t o c k sO that would, given equilibrium play, be steady
states if the zoning rules were ﬁxed at Z; i.e., Φ(Z)={O0 |O(O0Z)=O0}. For example,
Φ((100)) = {O0 |O0 =( 1− )(1 − ()00() − 0)f o r ∈ [0()]}
Then, we say that the steady state (O∗Z∗) is strongly locally stable if there exists 0s u c h
that for any initial state (OZ) with the property that kO − O∗k we have that Z(OZ)=Z∗
for  =1 ∞ and lim→∞ O(OZ) ∈ Φ(Z∗). This deﬁnition reduces to our earlier one in the
case in which there is a unique steady state associated with a particular set of zoning rules.
We now demonstrate that Proposition 3 holds with this new more general deﬁnition of strong
local stability. Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists a political equilibrium with endogenous
zoning with an equilibrium steady state (O∗Z∗)w h i c hw a sb o t he ﬃcient and strongly locally
stable. The logic from Proposition 3 applies if two communities are zoning, since the unzoned
community is a monopoly supplier of new small homes. So we can assume that only one community
is zoning. Assume that community 1 is the community who zones so that O∗ =( 1− )(1 −
()00()−0)f o rs o m e ∈ [0()] and Z∗ =( 1 00) If (O∗Z∗) is strongly locally
stable it must be the case that there exists 0 such that for any initial state (OZ)w i t h
the property that kO − O∗k we have that Z(OZ)=Z∗ for  =1 ∞ and lim→∞
O(OZ) ∈ Φ(Z∗).
Now consider for  small and positive the stock
O =( 1− )(1 − ()0() −  − 0)
54We will show that for suﬃciently small , 0
2(OZ∗) 6= 0 which will contradict the assumption
(O∗Z∗) is strongly locally stable.
Suppose ﬁrst that the residents of community 2 follow the postulated equilibrium and do not
impose zoning. As the eﬃcient steady state is strongly locally stable, the future play of the
equilibrium will have community 1 implementing zoning and communities 2 and 3 not. All new
construction of small homes will occur in community 2 and the price of new small homes will be
less than  in community 3. All new construction of large homes will occur in community 1 and
the price of large homes in community 2 will be less than .L e t 0
2 be the fraction of large
homes in community 2 after  = 0,....,∞ periods and let 0
2 be the price of such houses.
Now suppose that the residents of community 2 were to deviate from the postulated equilibrium
behavior by imposing zoning. By strong local stability, in all subsequent periods, households
anticipate that zoning rules will return to steady state levels. In the period the deviation becomes
eﬀective, new construction of small homes will occur in community 3. However, the price of
small homes in community 2 must be higher than those in community 3 because of the beneﬁcial
ﬁscal externality created by the presence of large homes. Let 1
20 be the price of small homes in
community 2 in the period the deviation becomes eﬀective. The value of large homes in community
2 will also be higher as will the fraction of large homes. Let 1
20 be the price of large homes
in community 2 and 1
20 the fraction. Following the period of deviation, there will be a lower
fraction of small homes in community 2 which will increase the price of large homes relative to the
equilibrium. Let 1
2 denote the fraction after  periods and let 1
2 denote the price. The price
of small homes in community 2 will return to  and the price of small homes in community 3
will be less than the construction cost.
Now consider the incentives to deviate for low types who own small homes in community 2.
The payoﬀ on the equilibrium path for a type  who owns a small house in community 2 and will
continue to live in a small house is
(1 − ) +  0




The continuation value  0























2 +( 1− 0
2)
) − 
+[(1 − ) +  0




55with end point condition
 0
∞ =





The payoﬀ under the deviation for a type  who owns a small house in community 2 and will
continue to live in a small house is
(1 − )1
20 +  1
































+[(1 − ) +  1




The continuation value  1























2 +( 1− 1
2)
) − 
+[(1 − ) +  1




with end point condition
 1
∞ =





The gain from deviating is




0 −  0
0
¤
But we have that
 1
0 −  0
0 = 1
0 − 1









 denote public service surplus on the equilibrium path and with the deviation.
Thus, we have that


















































































































20 ≥  and 1
20  0






























































Combining (46) and (47), we have
∆ ≥ (1 −  − )[1

















We also claim that  1
1 ≥  0













































2 +( 1− 0
2)
)















2 +( 1− 1
2)

which implies the result.













20 ≤ (() − ), this must be positive for suﬃciently small  given that 1 −  .
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